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WHY PECKING ORDER THEORY SHOULD BE INCLUDED
IN INTRODUCTORY FINANCE COURSES
THOMAS J. LIESZ
MESA STATE COLLEGE

ABSTRACT
The majority of students majoring in various business administration emphases take
only one finance course (Introductory Financial Management) while completing the
requirements of their degrees. A primary topic commonly covered in most
introductory finance courses is capital structure, with a discussion that often
culminates with a discussion of optimal capital structure. Invariably the leading
textbooks present optimal capital structure within the framework of the agency
cost/tax shield trade-off model that evolved from Modigliani and Miller’s capital
structure irrelevance hypothesis. While this approach has solid grounding in value
maximization arguments and capital market equilibrium theory, it nonetheless fails to
explain several commonly observed - and reported - practices in modern corporate
finance. Pecking order theory offers an intriguing addition to the explanation of
optimal capital structure, even in an introductory course. However, few introductory
textbooks give the theory much more than a cursory mention, if it is indeed mentioned
at all. The purpose of this paper is to make a case for including pecking order theory
in any discussion of optimal capital structure.
I. INTRODUCTION
Studying capital structure is an important component of any typical introductory
finance course. The topic provides closure to a representative unit about capital
budgeting and cost of capital as students discover the parameters faced by financial
managers as they determine how best to finance capital projects that will hopefully
enhance the value of their firms. Such a unit also amplifies the importance of, and
provides a stronger theoretical foundation for, financial analysis students are likely to
encounter in subsequent courses such as Business Policy or Strategic
Management. The traditional approach found in most introductory textbooks is to
present Modigliani and Miller’s capital structure irrelevance hypothesis (Modigliani
& Miller, 1958) and then build in the effects of taxes, financial distress, and agency
costs until the “mainstream” model of optimal capital structure emerges. It is a tidy
approach (often referred to as the “Trade-Off Model”) that is easily understood under
the basic underlying tenet of optimizing value - and thus shareholder wealth - by
choosing a capital structure combination which elicits the lowest possible cost of
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capital for the firm. Once the firm finds this optimal combination of financing
sources (that is, the mix of debt and equity sources that equates the benefits of the tax
shield provided by debt with the increased costs of financial distress borne by the
firm’s equity holders) the assumption is that every new dollar of financing is raised in
the same proportions of debt and equity financing. However, this approach falls short
in two different and important categories: reported and observed practice!
II. REPORTED PRACTICE
Two separate surveys examining capital structure decisions revealed very similar
results. In each survey financial executives were asked which of two major criteria
determined their financing decisions: 1) maintaining a target capital structure or 2)
following a hierarchy of financing. Further, those who followed a hierarchy were
asked to rank the order in which they would use various internal and external sources
of funding. The first survey (Pinegar & Wilbricht, 1989) was of Fortune 500 firms
and the second (Hittle, Haddad & Gitman, 1992) was of the 500 largest Over-TheCounter firms. The results regarding which criterion was most often followed are
shown in Table 1 below:
Table 1. Reported Use of Financing Decision Methodologies
SURVEY
AUTHORS

RESPONDENT
GROUP

%

USING
TARGET
CAP STRUCTURE

% USING
HIERARCHY

Pinegar & Wilbricht Fortune 500 Firms

31%

69%

Hittle, et al.

11%

89%

Large OTC Firms

It is easy to see from the data in Table 1 that in real-world practice financial managers
are much more likely to use a hierarchical approach than a target capital structure
rationale when making financing decisions. While this would seem to be inconsistent
with value maximization arguments, this behavior is actually very rational given the
motivations of managers and the vagaries of the U.S. capital markets.
III. OBSERVED PRACTICE
There are three observed real-world phenomena that are difficult to explain under the
agency cost/tax shield trade-off model. These include: 1) in many industries the most
profitable firms often have the lowest debt ratios - which is the opposite of what the
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trade-off model would predict (Sunder & Myers, 1999); 2) large positive abnormal
returns for a firm’s stockholders are associated more frequently with leverageincreasing events (such as stock repurchases or debt-for-equity exchanges) than
leverage-decreasing events (such as issuing stock) (Dann, 1981 and James, 1987); and
3) few American companies issue new stock as frequently as once per decade. Taken
together, these observed practices of American firms further support the notion that
target capital structure is not the primary criterion used by financial managers when
making financing decisions. (Megginson, 1997)
Thus, while the trade-off model is useful for explaining how financial
managers can make financing decisions, it appears to have marginal explanatory value
for how many financial managers actually do make these decisions in the real
world. With this in mind a case for introducing students to pecking order theory to
complement trade-off theory can be made. Table 2 below shows a sampling of how
several popular financial management textbooks address the issue of optimal capital
structure.
Table 2. Sampling of Textbook Approaches to Optimal Capital Structure Discussion
TEXTBOOK

PRESENTS
PRESENTS
ONLY TRADE- BOTH MODELS
OFF

Brigham, Gapenski & Ehrhardt
Brigham & Houston

X
X

Brealey & Myers

X

Lasher

X

Gitman

X

Moyer, McGuigan & Kretlow

X

Ross, Westerfield & Jordan

X

Van Horne & Wachowicz

X

Mountain Plains Journal of Business and Economics, Volume 2, 2001

46

As Table 2 shows, many of the popular financial management and corporate finance
textbooks do not present any competing theory to the traditional trade-off model. Of
the textbooks that do present both models the discussion of pecking order is often
much briefer than that of the trade-off model. Thus, many students never get exposed
to any other model than the trade-off and are left with the incorrect impression that it
is the only valid capital structure model in existence. This could lead to incorrect
assumptions regarding capital budgeting later on.
IV. PECKING ORDER THEORY OVERVIEW
Pecking order theory of capital structure states that firms have a preferred hierarchy
for financing decisions. The highest preference is to use internal financing (retained
earnings and the effects of depreciation) before resorting to any form of external
funds. Internal funds incur no flotation costs and require no additional disclosure of
proprietary financial information that could lead to more severe market discipline and
a possible loss of competitive advantage. If a firm must use external funds, the
preference is to use the following order of financing sources: debt, convertible
securities, preferred stock, and common stock. (Myers, 1984) This order reflects the
motivations of the financial manager to retain control of the firm (since only common
stock has a “voice” in management), reduce the agency costs of equity, and avoid the
seemingly inevitable negative market reaction to an announcement of a new equity
issue. (Hawawini & Viallet, 1999)
Implicit in pecking order theory are two key assumptions about financial
managers. The first of these is asymmetric information, or the likelihood that a firm’s
managers know more about the company’s current earnings and future growth
opportunities than do outside investors. There is a strong desire to keep such
information proprietary. The use of internal funds precludes managers from having to
make public disclosures about the company’s investment opportunities and potential
profits to be realized from investing in them. The second assumption is that managers
will act in the best interests of the company’s existing shareholders. The managers
may even forgo a positive-NPV project if it would require the issue of new equity,
since this would give much of the project’s value to new shareholders at the expense
of the old. (Myers & Majluf, 1984)
V. CAPITAL MARKET TREATMENT OF NEW SECURITY ISSUES
The two assumptions noted above help to explain some of the observed behavior of
financial managers. More insight is gained by looking at how the capital markets treat
the announcement of new security issues. Announcements of new debt generally are
treated as a positive signal that the issuing firm feels strongly about its ability to
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service the debt into the future. Announcements of new common stock are generally
treated as a negative signal that the firm’s managers feel the company’s stock is
overvalued (i.e. earnings are likely to decline in the future) and they wish to take
advantage of a market opportunity. So, it is easy to see why financial managers use
new common stock as a last resort in capital structure decisions. Just the
announcement of a new stock issue will cause the price of the firm’s stock to fall as
the market participants try to sort out the implications of the firm choosing to issue a
new equity issue.
VI. HOW PECKING ORDER IS SUPERIOR TO THE TRADE-OFF MODEL
While the trade-off model implies a static approach to financing decisions based upon
a target capital structure, pecking order theory allows for the dynamics of the firm to
dictate an optimal capital structure for a given firm at any particular point in
time. (Copeland & Weston, 1988) A firm’s capital structure is a function of its
internal cash flows and the amount of positive-NPV investment opportunities
available. A firm that has been very profitable in an industry with relatively slow
growth (i.e. few investment opportunities) will have no incentive to issue debt and
will likely have a low debt-to-equity ratio. A less profitable firm in the same industry
will likely have a high debt-to-equity ratio. The more profitable a firm, the
more financial slack it can build up.
Financial slack is defined as a firm’s highly liquid assets (cash and marketable
securities) plus any unused debt capacity. (Moyer, McGuigan, and Kretlow,
2001) Firms with sufficient financial slack will be able to fund most, if not all, of their
investment opportunities internally and will not have to issue debt or equity
securities. Not having to issue new securities allows the firm to avoid both the
flotation costs associated with external funding and the monitoring and market
discipline that occurs when accessing capital markets.
Prudent financial managers will attempt to maintain financial flexibility while
ensuring the long-term survivability of their firms. When profitable firms retain their
earnings as equity and build up cash reserves, they create the financial slack that
allows financial flexibility and, ultimately long-term survival.
Pecking order theory explains these observed and reported managerial actions while
the trade-off model cannot. It also explains stock market reactions to leverageincreasing and leverage-decreasing event, which the trade-off model cannot.
VII. LIMITATIONS OF PECKING ORDER THEORY
Pecking order theory, however, does not explain the influence of taxes, financial
distress, security issuance costs, agency costs, or the set of investment opportunities
Mountain Plains Journal of Business and Economics, Volume 2, 2001

48

available to a firm upon that firm’s actual capital structure. It also ignores the
problems that can arise when a firm’s managers accumulate so much financial slack
that they become immune to market discipline. In such a case it would be possible for
a firm’s management to preclude ever being penalized via a low security price and, if
augmented with non-financial takeover defenses, immune to being removed in a
hostile acquisition. For these reasons pecking order theory is offered as a complement
to, rather than a substitution for, the traditional trade-off model.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
While the traditional trade-off model is useful for explaining corporate debt levels,
pecking order theory is superior for explaining capital structure changes. By
including a discussion of pecking order theory in the capital structure unit students
will be exposed to a broad base of both theory and practice that will enable them to
better understand how important financing decisions are made. In addition to the
traditional discussion of the impact of taxes, financial distress, and agency costs upon
capital structure decisions, students will gain insight to how management motivations
and market perceptions also impact these decisions. Students will readily appreciate
the concern managers have regarding the reporting requirements required to access
capital markets. They will also be able to explain why observed practice does not
seem to always follow theory.
Furthermore, the addition of pecking order theory into the basic discussion of capital
structure provides one more opportunity for critical thinking to occur. For example,
the instructor can show how the debt ratios of leading companies in particular
industries differ from the so-called industry averages to which most companies are
usually compared during a cross-sectional financial analysis. Thus, a given ratio
(such as a debt ratio only half the industry average) might be argued as a “good” thing
(since the firm has a large supply of financial slack and financial flexibility) rather
than as a point of concern (the firm has opportunity costs due to not making efficient
use of debt). Students will have to critically evaluate that particular condition to judge
which conclusion is correct.
To summarize, by studying pecking order theory in conjunction with trade-off theory
students will have a more rounded exposure to optimal capital structure. This will
prepare them well for not only future courses in which they will apply this knowledge,
but also for their careers in the “real world” of business. Table 3 summarizes the
important differences between the two theories.
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Table 3. Comparison of Trade-off and Pecking Order Theory Traits.
TRADE-OFF THEORY

PECKING ORDER THEORY

Conforms with value maximizing
construct

Considers managerial motivations

Assumes a relatively static capital
structure

Allows for a dynamic capital structure

Considers the influence of taxes,
transaction costs, and financial distress

Considers the influence of financial slack
and availability of positive-NPV projects

Ignores the impact of capital market
“signals”

Acknowledges capital market “signals”

Ignores concerns regarding proprietary
data

Acknowledges proprietary data concerns

Cannot explain many real-world practices Explains many real-world practices
As Table 3 indicates, by including a combination of both the trade-off and pecking
order theories, students will receive a more rounded view of capital structure theory
and practice. This view will better serve them both as they work their way through
the upper-division coursework in business and as they begin their professional
careers.
Accordingly, authors of textbooks aimed at the introductory finance course are
encouraged to give adequate exposure to pecking order theory as well as the
traditional trade-off approach. And instructors of introductory finance courses are
urged to include pecking order in any discussion of capital structure theory. To do
any less presents an unrealistic view of this important topic.
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